We study the computational complexity of several scenarios of strategic behavior for the Kemeny procedure in the setting of judgment aggregation. In particular, we investigate (1) manipulation, where an individual aims to achieve a better group outcome by reporting an insincere individual opinion, (2) bribery, where an external agent aims to achieve an outcome with certain properties by bribing a number of individuals, and (3) control (by adding or deleting issues), where an external agent aims to achieve an outcome with certain properties by influencing the set of issues in the judgment aggregation situation. We show that determining whether these types of strategic behavior are possible (and if so, computing a policy for successful strategic behavior) is complete for the second level of the Polynomial Hierarchy. That is, we show that these problems are Σ p 2 -complete.
Introduction
An important topic in the research field of computational social choice is the (im)possibility of strategic behavior in collective decision making. This is epitomized by the eminence of results such as the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem [16, 22] , that identifies various conditions under which strategic voting (or manipulation) is, in principle, unavoidable. Manipulation in voting is a typical example of strategic behavior, and involves individuals reporting insincere preferences with the aim of obtaining a group outcome that is preferable for them.
Since strategic behavior in collective decision making is generally considered to be (socially) undesirable, a lot of research effort has been invested in diagnosing what social choice procedures are resistant to strategic behavior, and under what conditions. An important research direction along these lines investigates how computational complexity can be used to establish that various social choice procedures are (in many cases) practically immune to strategic behavior [2, 5] . For example, in many cases, it is in principle possible to manipulate voting rules (by reporting insincere preferences), but determining what insincere preference leads to a better outcome is computationally so demanding that it prevents manipulative behavior from being a useful policy.
Contributions In this paper, we use the framework of computational complexity theory to study several scenarios of strategic behavior in the setting of judgment aggregation. Judgment aggregation studies collective decision making on a set of issues that are logically related [12] . In particular, we study three scenarios of strategic behavior for the Kemeny judgment aggregation procedure-which is one of the most prominent judgment aggregation procedures known from the literature. We investigate: 2. bribery, where an external party bribes several individuals that are involved in the group decision process (that is, the briber stipulates their individual judgments) in order to obtain a group judgment with certain properties; and 3. control, where an external party controls the set of issues that are involved in the judgment aggregation setting, with the aim of achieving a group judgment with certain properties.
Concretely, we study various different decision problems that formalize the computational tasks involved in the strategic behavior in each of these scenarios. We show that all the computational problems that we consider in this paper are Σ p 2 -complete. That is, we show that:
• Manipulation for the Kemeny rule in judgment aggregation is Σ p 2 -complete.
• Bribery for the Kemeny rule in judgment aggregation is Σ p 2 -complete.
• Control (by adding or removing issues) for the Kemeny rule in judgment aggregation is Σ indicates that a problem is computationally intractable. Even the easier problem of checking whether a given candidate solution is in fact a solution is not efficiently solvable-it requires solving an NP-complete problem.)
Various different frameworks have been used in the literature to formalize the setting of judgment aggregation (see, e.g., [13] ). The computational complexity results that we develop hold for two commonly considered judgment aggregation frameworks: formulabased judgment aggregation and constraint-based judgment aggregation. We discuss these judgment aggregation frameworks in more detail in Section 2.2. (In order to capture the scenario of control naturally in the constraint-based judgment aggregation framework, we consider a slightly extended variant of this framework. For more details, see Section 2.2.3.)
Most of the various forms of strategic behavior that we consider in this paper involve the incentive of achieving a preferable group outcome. There are various ways to define preference relations over (individual and group) judgments. The preferences that we study are based on weighted Hamming distances. That is, we consider weight functions that assign to each issue a weight that indicates how important it is for an individual (or for an external party) that the group judgment agree with their judgment on this issue. Such weight functions naturally induce preference relations over judgments.
In addition, we study variants of the strategic behavior scenarios where the objective is to obtain a group judgment that includes a given set of conclusions. This can be seen as an all-or-nothing variants (the group outcome either includes the required set of conclusions or it does not), whereas the variants involving preferences based on weighted Hamming distances offer a more gradual view (maybe the optimal outcome is not possible, but the current outcome can still be improved slightly by behaving strategically).
Worst-case Complexity
The computational intractability results that we provide in this paper can be seen as positive results, since they show that various kinds of undesirable strategic behavior cannot be used efficiently across the board due to computational complexity obstructions. However, it is important to emphasize that the computational complexity results that we provide in this paper are worst-case complexity results. Worstcase intractability results indicate that there is no algorithm that works efficiently in all possible cases. However, it might well be the case that there are restricted settings where several forms of strategic behavior are efficiently possible.
In order to consolidate the conclusion that strategic behavior for the Kemeny procedure in judgment aggregation is computationally intractable, further research is needed. Such further research would have to establish that the various forms of strategic behavior remain computationally intractable in many restricted settings. A key tool for establishing computational complexity results for restricted settings is the paradigm of parameterized complexity [10, 11, 15, 20] -this is a framework where the complexity of computational problems is measured in a multi-dimensional way, in contrast to the classical theory of computational complexity, where the complexity of problems is measured only in terms of the input size in bits.
Related Work The concept of manipulation in judgment aggregation has been studied before in the literature, both from an axiomatic point of view [4, 6, 8] and from a computational complexity point of view [3, 14] . The complexity analysis of manipulation in judgment aggregation that has been done in the literature is restricted to uniform premisebased quota rules. Additionally, bribery in judgment aggregation has been studied from a computational complexity point of view for uniform premise-based quota rules [3] .
Outline We begin in Section 2 by considering relevant notions from computational complexity and judgment aggregation that we use in this paper. Then, in Section 3, we develop the intractability results for the scenario of manipulation. In Section 4, we turn to the scenario of bribery, and in Section 5, we consider the scenario of control (by adding or deleting issues). Finally, we conclude in Section 6.
Preliminaries
Before we turn to the complexity results that we develop in this paper, we review several relevant concepts from computational complexity theory and judgment aggregation.
Complexity Theory
We begin with reviewing some basic notions from computational complexity. We assume the reader to be familiar with the complexity classes P and NP, and with basic notions such as polynomial-time reductions. For more details, we refer to textbooks on computational complexity theory (see, e.g., [1] ).
We briefly review the classes of the Polynomial Hierarchy (PH) [19, 21, 23, 24] . In order to do so, we consider quantified Boolean formulas. A (fully) quantified Boolean formula (in prenex form) is a formula of the form Q 1 x 1 Q 2 x 2 . . . Q n x n .ψ, where all x i are propositional variables, each Q i is either an existential or a universal quantifier, and ψ is a (quantifier-free) propositional formula over the variables x 1 , . . . , x n . Truth for such formulas is defined in the usual way.
To consider the complexity classes of the PH, we restrict the number of quantifier alternations occurring in quantified Boolean formulas, i.e., the number of times where Q i = Q i+1 . We consider the complexity classes Σ p k , for each k ≥ 1. Let k ≥ 1 be an arbitrary, fixed constant. The complexity class Σ p k consists of all decision problems for which there exists a polynomial-time reduction to the problem QSat k , that is defined as follows. Instances of the problem QSat k are quantified Boolean formulas of the form ∃x 1 . . . ∃x ℓ1 ∀x ℓ1+1 . . . ∀x ℓ2 . . . 
Alternatively, one can characterize the class Σ p 2 using nondeterministic polynomial-time algorithms with access to an oracle for an NP-complete problem. Let O be a decision problem. A Turing machine M with access to an O oracle is a Turing machine with a dedicated oracle tape and dedicated statesuery , q yes and q no . Whenever M is in the stateuery , it does not proceed according to the transition relation, but instead it transitions into the state q yes if the oracle tape contains a string x that is a yes-instance for the problem O, i.e., if x ∈ O, and it transitions into the state q no if x ∈ O. Intuitively, the oracle solves arbitrary instances of O in a single time step. The class Σ p 2 consists of all decision problems that can be solved in polynomial time by a nondeterministic Turing machine that has access to an O-oracle, for some O ∈ NP.
Judgment Aggregation
Next, we introduce the two formal judgment aggregation frameworks that we use in this paper: formula-based judgment aggregation (as used by, e.g., [7, 14, 18] ) and constraintbased judgment aggregation (as used by, e.g., [17] ). Moreover, we briefly discuss an extended variant of the constraint-based judgment aggregation framework (as considered in, e.g., [13] ).
Formula-Based Judgment Aggregation
We begin with the framework of formula-based judgment aggregation.
An agenda is a finite, nonempty set Φ of formulas that does not contain any doublynegated formulas and that is closed under complementation. Moreover, if Φ = {ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ n , ¬ϕ 1 , . . . , ¬ϕ n } is an agenda, then we let [Φ] = {ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ n } denote the pre-agenda associated to the agenda Φ. We denote the bitsize of the agenda Φ by size(Φ) = ϕ∈Φ |ϕ|. A judgment set J for an agenda Φ is a subset J ⊆ Φ. We call a judgment set J complete if ϕ ∈ J or ∼ϕ ∈ J for all ϕ ∈ Φ; and we call it consistent if there exists an assignment that makes all formulas in J true. Intuitively, the consistent and complete judgment sets are the opinions that individuals and the group can have.
We associate with each agenda Φ an integrity constraint Γ, that can be used to further restrict the set of feasible opinions. Such an integrity constraint consists of a single propositional formula. We say that a judgment set J is Γ-consistent if there exists a truth assignment that simultaneously makes all formulas in J and Γ true. Let J (Φ, Γ) denote the set of all complete and Γ-consistent subsets of Φ. We say that finite sequences J ∈ J (Φ, Γ) + of complete and Γ-consistent judgment sets are profiles, and where convenient we equate a profile J = (J 1 , . . . , J p ) with the (multi)set {J 1 , . . . , J p }. Moreover, for i ∈ [p], we let J −i denote the profile (J 1 , . . . , J i−1 , J i+1 , . . . , J p ).
A judgment aggregation procedure (or rule) for the agenda Φ and the integrity constraint Γ is a function F that takes as input a profile J ∈ J (Φ, Γ) + , and that produces a non-empty set of non-empty judgment sets. We call a judgment aggregation procedure F resolute if for any profile J it returns a singleton, i.e., |F (J )| = 1; otherwise, we call F irresolute. We call a judgment aggregation procedure F anonymous if for every profile J = (J 1 , . . . , J p ) and for every permutation π :
). An example of a resolute, anonymous judgment aggregation procedure is the strict majority rule Majority, where Majority(J ) = {J * }, where ϕ ∈ J tent. Consider the agenda Φ with [Φ] = {p, q, p → q}, and the profile J = (J 1 , J 2 , J 3 ), where
The Kemeny aggregation procedure is based on a notion of distance. This distance is based on the Hamming distance d(J,
}| between two complete judgment sets J, J ′ . Intuitively, the Hamming distance d(J, J ′ ) counts the number of issues on which two judgment sets disagree. Let J be a single Γ-consistent and complete judgment set, and let (J 1 , . . . , J p ) = J ∈ J (Φ, Γ)
+ be a profile. We define the distance between J and J to be Dist(J, J ) = i∈[p] d(J, J i ). Then, we let the outcome Kemeny Φ,Γ (J ) of the Kemeny rule be the set of those J * ∈ J (Φ, Γ) for which there is no J ∈ J (Φ, Γ) such that Dist(J, J ) < Dist(J * , J ). (If Φ and Γ are clear from the context, we often write Kemeny(J ) to denote Kemeny Φ,Γ (J ).) Intuitively, the Kemeny rule selects those complete and Γ-consistent judgment sets that minimize the cumulative Hamming distance to the judgment sets in the profile. The Kemeny rule is irresolute, complete, Γ-consistent and anonymous.
Constraint-Based Judgment Aggregation
We continue with the framework of constraint-based judgment aggregation.
Let I = {x 1 , . . . , x n } be a finite set of issues, in the form of propositional variables. Intuitively, these issues are the topics about which the individuals want to combine their judgments. A truth assignment α : I → B is called a ballot, and represents an opinion that individuals and the group can have. We will also denote ballots α by a binary vector (b 1 , . . . , b n ) ∈ B n , where
. Moreover, we say that (p 1 , . . . , p n ) ∈ {0, 1, ⋆} n is a partial ballot, and that (p 1 , . . . , p n ) agrees with a bal-
. As in the case for formula-based judgment aggregation, we introduce an integrity constraint Γ, that can be used to restrict the set of feasible opinions (for both the individuals and the group). The integrity constraint Γ is a propositional formula on the variables x 1 , . . . , x n . We define the set R(I, Γ) of rational ballots to be the ballots (for I) that satisfy the integrity constraint Γ. Rational ballots in the constraint-based judgment aggregation framework correspond to complete and Γ-consistent judgment sets in the formula-based judgment aggregation framework. We say that finite sequences r ∈ R(I, Γ) + of rational ballots are profiles, and where convenient we equate a profile r = (r 1 , . . . , r p ) with the (multi)set {r 1 , . . . , r p }. Moreover, for i ∈ [p], we let r −i denote the profile (r 1 , . . . , r i−1 , r i+1 , . . . , r p ).
A judgment aggregation procedure (or rule), for the set I of issues and the integrity constraint Γ, is a function F that takes as input a profile r ∈ R(I, Γ) + , and that produces a non-empty set of ballots. We call a judgment aggregation procedure F resolute if for any profile r it returns a singleton, i.e., |F (r)| = 1; otherwise, we call F irresolute. We call a judgment aggregation procedure F anonymous if for every profile r = (r 1 , . . . , r p ) and for every permutation π :
, where r ′ = (r π(1) , . . . , r π(p) ). We call a judgment aggregation procedure F rational (or consistent ), if r is rational for every r ∈ R(I, Γ) + and every r ∈ F (r). As an example of a judgment aggregation procedure we consider the strict majority rule Majority, where Majority(r) = {(b 1 , . . . , b n )} and where each b i agrees with the majority of the i-th bits in the ballots in r (in case of a tie, we arbitrarily let b i = 0). To see that Majority is not rational, consider the set I = {x 1 , x 2 , x 3 } of issues, the integrity constraint Γ = x 3 ↔ (x 1 → x 2 ), and the profile r = (r 1 , r 2 , r 3 ), where r 1 = (1, 1, 1), r 2 = (1, 0, 0), and r 3 = (0, 0, 1). The unique outcome (1, 0, 1) in Majority(r) is not rational.
The Kemeny aggregation procedure is defined for the constraint-based judgment aggregation framework as follows. Similarly to the case for formula-based judgment aggregation, the Kemeny rule is based on the Hamming distance d(r, r
for the set I of issues and the integrity constraint Γ. Let r be a single ballot, and let (r 1 , . . . , r p ) = r ∈ R(I, Γ) + be a profile. We define the distance between r and r to be Dist(r, r) = i∈[p] d(r, r i ). Then, we let the outcome Kemeny I,Γ (r) of the Kemeny rule be the set of those ballots r * ∈ R(I, Γ) for which there is no r ∈ R(I, Γ) such that Dist(r, r) < Dist(r * , r). (If I and Γ are clear from the context, we often write Kemeny(r) to denote Kemeny I,Γ (r).) The Kemeny rule is irresolute, anonymous and rational.
Extended Constraint-Based Judgment Aggregation
Finally, we consider an extended variant of the constraint-based judgment aggregation framework. In the constraint-based judgment aggregation framework, we consider a set I of issues and an integrity constraint in the form of a propositional formula Γ that satisfies the constraint that Var(Γ) ⊆ I. However, in some situations it is more convenient to allow the integrity constraint Γ to contain additional variables. In the extended constraint-based framework, we relax the condition that Var(Γ) ⊆ I, and we allow arbitrary propositional formulas as integrity constraints. This modification requires us to adapt the notion of rationality accordingly. A ballot α : I → B is said to be rational if Γ[α] is satisfiable-that is, if there is some truth assignment β : Var(Γ)\I → B such that α ∪ β satisfies Γ.
Preferences over Opinions
Strategic behavior for judgment aggregation (such as the problems of manipulation, bribery and control) involves the incentive to obtain a "better" outcome. Therefore, in order to study strategic behavior, it is essential to define a notion of preference over opinions-that is, when is one opinion "better than" (or preferred over) another opinion.
In the worst case, the number of possible opinions that play a role is exponential in the number of issues-e.g., for m issues there could be up to 2 m possible opinions. As a result, it is unreasonable to expect agents to explicitly specify a preference relation over all (feasible) opinions. Instead it makes more sense to use a compact specification language to represent a preference relation over opinions. In this paper, we will use one such specification method that can be used to capture a wide range of preferences. Various preference relations over opinions have been studied in the literature [3, 6, 8] .
We consider preferences based on a weighted Hamming distance. We define this weighted Hamming distance for the setting of formula-based judgment aggregation. Definitions for the setting of constraint-based judgment aggregation are entirely similar. Take an agenda Φ together with an integrity constraint Γ. An agent can specify their preference relation over complete and Γ-consistent judgment sets J ∈ J (Φ, Γ) by providing a weight function w : [Φ] → N that produces a weight w(ϕ) for each formula ϕ ∈ [Φ]. Intuitively, for each ϕ ∈ [Φ], the weight w(ϕ) indicates how important it is for the agent that the outcome agrees with their truthful opinion on the issue ϕ. (Alternatively, one could consider weight functions that produce rational or real weights.) Then, for two complete judgment sets J 1 and J 2 the weighted Hamming distance d(J 1 , J 2 , w) is defined as follows:
That is, for each formula ϕ ∈ [Φ] that J and J ′ disagree on, the weighted Hamming distance is increased by w(ϕ).
Using this notion of weighted Hamming distance, we can define a preference relation for an agent. Suppose that the agent's truthful opinion is given by a complete and Γ-consistent judgment set J. Moreover, suppose that the agent's view on the relative importance of the separate issues is given by a weight function w : [Φ] → N. Then the preference relation ≤ w,J for this agent is defined as follows. For any two complete and Γ-consistent judgment sets J 1 , J 2 , it holds:
Correspondingly, a judgment set J 1 is (strictly) preferred over another judgment set J 2 if and only if the weighted Hamming distance from J 1 to J is (strictly) smaller than the weighted Hamming distance from J 2 to J.
A particular case of the weighted Hamming distance is the unweighted Hamming distance. That is, the case where w(ϕ) = 1 for all ϕ ∈ [Φ]. Whenever the weight function w is the constant function that always returns 1, we drop the "w" from the notation-that is, the unweighted Hamming distance between two judgment sets J 1 and J 2 is denoted by d(J 1 , J 2 ).
Other preference relations In the literature, there have been various proposals for notions of preference over opinions. For example, the phenomenon of manipulation in judgment aggregation has been studied in the settings (1) where one judgment set is preferred over another if it agrees with a fixed optimal judgment set on at least one issue where the other judgment set disagrees [8] , and (2) where one judgment set is preferred over a second judgment set if it agrees with a fixed optimal judgment set on at least one issue where the second judgment set disagrees, and for all issues it holds that if the second judgment set agrees with the optimal judgment set then the first judgment set also agrees with the optimal [8] . Other preference relations that have been investigated are top-respecting preferences and closeness-respecting preferences. The class of top-respecting preferences contains all preferences that prefer a single most preferred judgment set over all other judgment sets (and the preference between the other judgment sets is arbitrary) [3, 6] . The class of closeness-respecting preferences contains preferences that additionally satisfy the condition of closeness: if one judgment set agrees with the most preferred judgment on a superset of issues compared to another judgment set, then the one judgment is preferred over the other [3, 6] .
Manipulation
The first form of strategic behavior in judgment aggregation that we consider is manipulation. This concerns cases where individuals aim to influence the outcome of the aggregation procedure in their favor by reporting an insincere judgment, that is, by reporting a judgment that differs from their beliefs.
For irresolute judgment aggregation procedures such as the Kemeny procedure, one can consider various requirements on the strategically reported insincere judgments. For instance, one could require that every outcome for the insincere judgment is preferred over every outcome for the sincere judgment. Alternatively, one could require that there is at least one outcome for the insincere judgment that is preferred over every outcome for the sincere judgment. Correspondingly, we consider the following decision problems. (We formalize these problems for the setting of formula-based judgment aggregation. For the setting of constraint-based judgment aggregation, these problems are defined entirely similarly. 
Superoptimistic-Manipulation(Kemeny) Instance: An agenda Φ with an integrity constraint Γ, a weight function w : [Φ] → N, and a profile J ∈ J (Φ, Γ) + . Question: Is there a complete and consistent judgment set 
Complexity Results
In this section, we prove the following result. • Optimistic-Manipulation(Kemeny),
• Pessimistic-Manipulation(Kemeny),
• Superoptimistic-Manipulation(Kemeny), and
Moreover, Σ This result follows from Propositions 2-5 and 7, and Corollaries 6 and 8, that we establish below.
Proof. We describe a nondeterministic polynomial-time algorithm with access to an NP oracle that solves the problem. Let (Φ, Γ, w, J ) specify an instance of Cautious-Manipulation(Kemeny). The algorithm proceeds in several steps.
Firstly, (1) the algorithm determines the minimum distance d win old from J to any complete and consistent judgment set J * ∈ J (Φ, Γ). That is, d
win old is the cumulative unweighted Hamming distance from the judgments in J to the judgment sets J * ∈ Kemeny(J ). This can be done in (deterministic) polynomial time using O(log n) queries to an NP oracle.
Then, (2) the algorithm determines the minimum distance d min old (weighted by w) from J 1 to any judgment set J * ∈ Kemeny(J ), that is, from J 1 to any complete and consistent judgment set J * that has cumulative unweighted Hamming distance d win old to the profile J . This can also be done in (deterministic) polynomial time using an NP oracle.
Next, (3a) the algorithm guesses a complete judgment set J ′ together with a truth assignment α : Var(Φ, Γ) → B, and it checks whether α satisfies both J ′ and Γ. This can be done in nondeterministic polynomial time. Moreover, (3b) the algorithm determines the minimum distance d win new from (J −1 , J ′ ) to any complete and consistent judgment set J * ∈ J (Φ, Γ). Finally, (3c) the algorithm determines by using a single query to an NP oracle whether there exists some complete and consistent judgment set
If this is the case, the algorithm rejects; otherwise, the algorithm accepts.
It is straightforward to verify that the algorithm runs in nondeterministic polynomial time. Moreover, the algorithm accepts the input (for some sequence of nondeterministic choices) if and only if there is some complete and consistent judgment set
Proof. We describe a nondeterministic polynomial-time algorithm with access to an NP oracle that solves the problem. Let (Φ, Γ, w, J ) specify an instance of Optimistic-Manipulation(Kemeny). The algorithm proceeds in several steps. For the first two steps, the algorithm proceeds exactly as the algorithm described in the proof of Proposition 2. That is, (1) the algorithm computes d win old and (2) it computes d min old , both in deterministic polynomial time using an NP oracle.
For the third step, the algorithm proceeds in a similar fashion as the algorithm described in the proof of Proposition 2. That is, (3a) the algorithm guesses a complete judgment set J ′ together with a truth assignment α : Var(Φ, Γ) → B, and it checks whether α satisfies both J ′ and Γ. Also, (3b) the algorithm determines the minimum unweighted Hamming distance d win new from (J −1 , J ′ ) to any complete and consistent judgment set J * ∈ J (Φ, Γ). This can be done using O(log n) queries to an NP oracle. Then, (3c ′ ) the algorithm guesses some complete judgment set J * new together with a truth assignment α ′ : Var(Φ, Γ) → B, and it checks whether α ′ satisfies both J * new and Γ. Moreover, the algorithm checks It is straightforward to verify that the algorithm runs in nondeterministic polynomial time. Moreover, the algorithm accepts the input (for some sequence of nondeterministic choices) if and only if there is some complete and consistent judgment set J ′ and some J * new ∈ Kemeny(J −1 , J ′ ) such that for all J * old ∈ Kemeny(J ) it holds that d(J Proof. We describe a nondeterministic polynomial-time algorithm with access to an NP oracle that solves the problem. Let (Φ, Γ, w, J ) specify an instance of Pessimistic-Manipulation(Kemeny). The algorithm proceeds in several steps. For the first step, the algorithm proceeds exactly as the algorithm described in the proof of Proposition 2. That is, (1) the algorithm computes d win old in deterministic polynomial time using O(log n) queries to an NP oracle.
Then, (2) the algorithm determines the maximum distance d max old (weighted by w) from J 1 to any judgment set J * ∈ Kemeny(J ), that is, from J 1 to any complete and consistent judgment set J * that has cumulative unweighted Hamming distance d win old to the profile J . This can also be done in (deterministic) polynomial time using an NP oracle.
Next, (3a) the algorithm guesses a complete judgment set J ′ together with a truth assignment α : Var(Φ, Γ) → B, and it checks whether α satisfies both J ′ and Γ. This can be done in nondeterministic polynomial time. Moreover, (3b) the algorithm determines the minimum unweighted Hamming distance d win new from (J −1 , J ′ ) to any complete and consistent judgment set J * ∈ J (Φ, Γ). Finally, (3c) the algorithm determines by using a single query to an NP oracle whether there exists some complete and consistent judgment set
Proof. We describe a nondeterministic polynomial-time algorithm with access to an NP oracle that solves the problem. Let (Φ, Γ, w, J ) specify an instance of SuperoptimisticManipulation(Kemeny). The algorithm proceeds in several steps. For the first steps, the algorithm proceeds exactly as the algorithm described in the proof of Proposition 2. That is, (1) the algorithm computes d It is straightforward to verify that the algorithm runs in nondeterministic polynomial time. Moreover, the algorithm accepts the input (for some sequence of nondeterministic choices) if and only if there is some complete and consistent judgment set J ′ , some J * new ∈ Kemeny(J −1 , J ′ ) and some J Proof (sketch). The algorithms described in the proofs of Proposition 2 and 5 can straightforwardly be modified and combined to form a nondeterministic polynomial-time algorithm with access to an NP oracle that solves Safe-Superoptimistic-Manipulation-(Kemeny). Let ϕ = ∃x 1 , . . . , x n .∀y 1 , . . . , y m .ψ be a quantified Boolean formula. Let X = {x 1 , . . . , x n } and Y = {y 1 , . . . , y m }. Without loss of generality, we assume that n is a multiple of 3-that is, that n = 3n ′ for some n ′ ∈ N. We construct an agenda Φ, an integrity constraint Γ, a weight function w : [Φ] → N, and a profile J as follows.
We consider fresh variables x Moreover, we consider fresh variables z 1 , . . . , z n/3 , fresh variables t 1 , . . . , t m , fresh variables w 1,ℓ for ℓ ∈ [n+1], fresh variables w 2,ℓ for i ∈ {2, 3} and ℓ ∈ [n], and fresh variables u i,ℓ for i ∈ [3] and ℓ ∈ [u], where u = 10n + 10m + 10. We then let the agenda Φ consist of the variables x 1 , . . . , x n and y 1 , . . . , y m and the fresh variables we introduced above, together with their negations. That is, we let
We then define the integrity constraint Γ as follows. We let
u i,ℓ , and
(¬y j ∧ ¬y
(Here ⊕ denotes exclusive disjunction.) As a result of the definition of Γ, each complete and consistent judgment set J ∈ J (Φ, Γ) satisfies (at least) one of the following four conditions. Finally, we let J = (J 1 , J 2 , J 3 ), where J 1 , J 2 , J 3 are defined as described in Table 1 . In this table, the indices i, j, ℓ range over all possible values, and for each ϕ ∈ [Φ] we write a 0 if ϕ ∈ J i and a 1 if ϕ ∈ J i . In the remainder, we will argue that there is some truth assignment α : X → B such that for all truth assignments β : Y → B it holds that ψ[α ∪ β] is true if and only if there is some complete and consistent judgment set J Table 2 . Both J * old,1 and J * old,2 are complete and consistent, and have a cumulative Hamming distance of 7n + 3m + 1 + 3u to the profile J . It is straightforward to verify that no complete and consistent judgment set has a smaller cumulative Hamming distance to the profile J . (For instance, the judgment sets of the form J * α , as described below in Table 3 , have a cumulative Hamming distance of 7n + 3m + 2 + 3u to the profile J .) Next, we argue that the only way for agent 1 to enforce an outcome that is closer to J 1 than J * old,1 and J * old,2 are, is to enforce an outcome J * that satisfies condition (3). It is impossible for agent 1 to force a complete and consistent judgment set that satisfies condition (1) to be a Kemeny outcome, because there are complete and consistent judgment sets at smaller distance to the profile for any judgment J ′ 1 that agent 1 reports (e.g., the judgment sets J * old,1 and J * old,2 ). For each of the complete and consistent judgment sets that satisfy condition (2), the Hamming distance to J 1 is at least as much as the Hamming distance from J 1 to J * old,1 and J * old,2 . Among the complete and consistent judgment sets that satisfy condition (4), the judgment sets J * old,1 and J * old,2 are of smallest Hamming distance to J 1 . Therefore, there is no insincere judgment J ′ 1 that agent 1 can report to obtain a Kemeny outcome satisfying condition (4) (⇒) Suppose that there exists some truth assignment α : X → B such that for all truth assignments β : Y → B it holds that ψ[α ∪ β] is true. Consider the complete and consistent judgment set J α that is described in Table 3 . We then get that Kemeny(J −1 , J α ) = {J * α }, where J * α is also described in Table 3 . The only possible complete and consistent judgment sets J * that could have a smaller Hamming distance to the profile (J −1 , J α ) would have to satisfy condition (2). That is, such judgment sets J * would have to include exactly one of y j and y (⇐) Conversely, suppose that there is some complete and consistent judgment set J . We now use the fact that J * α ∈ Kemeny(J ′ ) to argue that for all truth assignments β : Y → B it holds that ψ[α ∪ β] is true. We proceed indirectly, and assume that there exists some truth assignment β : Y → B such that ψ[α ∪ β] is false. Then consider the complete and consistent judgment set J * β that is described in Table 4 . Because ψ[α ∪ β] is false, we know that J * β is consistent-it satisfies condition (2) 
Namely, the judgment set J * α has Hamming distance 6n + 3m + 2 + 2u to the profile J ′ , and the judgment set J * β has Hamming distance 6n + 3m + 1 + 2u to the profile J ′ . This is a contradiction with the fact that J * α ∈ Kemeny(J ′ ). Therefore, we can conclude that no truth assignment β : Y → B exists such that ψ[α ∪ β] is false. In other words, for all truth assignments β : Y → B it holds that ψ[α ∪ β] is true. 
3-Clauses and Trivial Integrity Constraints
The result of Theorem 1 can straightforwardly be extended to the setting where Γ = ⊤ and where all formulas ϕ ∈ [Φ] are clauses of size 3. Clearly, membership in Σ p 2 holds also for this restricted setting. In order to show Σ p 2 -hardness, the proof of Proposition 7 can be modified as follows, in two steps. First, we take many syntactic variants χ 1 , . . . , χ u of the integrity constraint Γ, and add these (and their negations) to the agenda. Moreover, all judgment sets in the profile J include these formulas χ 1 , . . . , χ u . Secondly, we transform each formula χ i into a 3CNF formula χ ′ i (by using the standard Tseitin transformation), and replace χ i in the agenda by the clauses of χ 
Constraint-Based Judgment Aggregation
The result of Theorem 1 can also straightforwardly be extended to the setting of constraintbased judgment aggregation. The algorithms described in Propositions 2-5 and Corollary 6 can directly be used in the setting of constraint-based judgment aggregation as well (so membership in Σ p 2 carries over to this setting). Since the proofs of Proposition 7 and Corollary 8 use an agenda containing only propositional variables (and their negations), this proof can also directly be used to show Σ 
Exact Manipulation
In the literature, the problem of manipulation in judgment aggregation has also been modelled using different decision problems (see, e.g., [3] ). One of these decision problems asks whether the manipulator can report an insincere opinion to obtain an outcome that includes a given desired subset of the agenda. This problem is often called exact manipulation. We consider two variants of this exact manipulation problem, and we argue that the Σ p 2 -completeness result of Theorem 1 extends to these problems.
Cautious-Exact-Manipulation(Kemeny)
Instance: An agenda Φ with an integrity constraint Γ, a (possibly incomplete) judgment set L ⊆ Φ, and a profile J ∈ J (Φ, Γ) + . Question: Is there a complete and consistent judgment set
Brave-Exact-Manipulation(Kemeny) Instance: An agenda Φ with an integrity constraint Γ, a (possibly incomplete) judgment set L ⊆ Φ, and a profile J ∈ J (Φ, Γ) + . Question: Is there a complete and consistent judgment set
Proposition 9. The problems Cautious-Exact-Manipulation(Kemeny) and BraveExact-Manipulation(Kemeny) are Σ 
Group Manipulation
The result of Theorem 1 also holds for the setting where a coalition of individuals works together by each reporting an insincere judgment with the aim of obtaining a group judgment that is preferable for each of the individuals in the coalition [4] . This group manipulation scenario is a generalization of the (individual) manipulation scenario that we study in this paper, since individual manipulation coincides with group manipulation for a coalition of size 1. The algorithms used to show membership in Σ p 2 can be straightforwardly modified to work also for group manipulation for the Kemeny procedure. Moreover, the Σ p 2 -hardness results directly carry over to the setting of group manipulation for the Kemeny procedure, since individual manipulation is a special case of group manipulation.
A more subtle form of group manipulation is that where each individual in the coalition is required to have no incentive to unilaterally leave the coalition (and report their truthful judgment) [4] . The Σ p 2 -hardness results from this paper carry over to this setting for the Kemeny procedure, since the scenario of individual manipulation is also a special case of the manipulation problem for fragile coalitions. Additionally, the Σ p 2 -membership proofs for the individual manipulation problem can be modified to work also for the group manipulation problem for fragile coalitions for the Kemeny procedure.
Another form of strategic behavior in judgment aggregation is bribery. In this setting, an external agent wishes to influence the outcome of a judgment aggregation scenario by bribing a number of individuals. We model this scenario as follows. (We consider the formula-based judgment aggregation framework; for the constraint-based judgment aggregation framework, this bribing scenario can be defined entirely similarly.)
A number of individuals are performing judgment aggregation on an agenda Φ in the presence of an integrity constraint Γ. The briber has a desired (complete and Γ-consistent) judgment set J 0 , and a weight function w : [Φ] → N that indicates the relative importance of the different issues for the briber. Additionally, the briber has a budget that suffices to bribe at most k individuals. For all bribed individuals, the briber can specify an arbitrary (complete and Γ-consistent) judgment set. The question is to determine whether the briber can pick up to k individuals and specify judgment sets for these individuals so that the outcome of the judgment aggregation procedure is better (with respect to J 0 and w) than without bribing.
To argue that such bribery can not be done easily in all possible situations, one can establish computational intractability results, that give evidence that there are no efficient algorithms that an external agent can use (across the board) to obtain a strategy for bribery.
Similarly to the case for manipulation, we can consider various requirements on the outcomes after bribery (in relation to the outcomes before bribery). For instance, we could require that every outcome after bribery is preferred over every outcome before bribery. Correspondingly, we consider the following decision problems. 
Complexity Results
In this section, we prove the following result. • Optimistic-Bribery(Kemeny),
• Pessimistic-Bribery(Kemeny),
• Superoptimistic-Bribery(Kemeny), and
• Safe-Superoptimistic-Bribery(Kemeny).
This result follows from Propositions 11 and 13 and Corollaries 12 and 14, that we establish below.
Proof. We describe a nondeterministic polynomial-time algorithm with access to an NP oracle that solves the problem. This algorithm is similar to the algorithm used in the proof of Proposition 2. Let (Φ, Γ, w, J , J 0 , k) specify an instance of Cautious-Bribery(Kemeny), where J = (J 1 , . . . , J p ). The algorithm proceeds in several steps.
Then, (2) the algorithm determines the minimum distance d min old (weighted by w) from J 0 to any judgment set J * ∈ Kemeny(J ), that is, from J 0 to any complete and consistent judgment set J * that has cumulative unweighted Hamming distance d win old to the profile J . This can also be done in (deterministic) polynomial time using an NP oracle.
Next, (3a) the algorithm guesses k indices 1 ≤ i 1 < · · · < i k ≤ p and guesses complete judgment sets J Proof (sketch). For each of these problems, a nondeterministic polynomial-time algorithm with access to an NP oracle can be constructed that solves the problem. These algorithms are analogous to the algorithms described in the proofs of Propositions 2-5 and 11, and Corollary 6.
Proof. We show Σ p 2 -hardness by giving a reduction from the satisfiability problem for quantified Boolean formulas of the form ∃x 1 , . . . , x n .∀y 1 , . . . , y m .ψ.
Let ϕ = ∃x 1 , . . . , x n .∀y 1 , . . . , y m .ψ be a quantified Boolean formula. Let X = {x 1 , . . . , x n } and Y = {y 1 , . . . , y m }. We construct an agenda Φ, an integrity constraint Γ, a weight function w : [Φ] → N, a profile J as follows, a judgment set J 0 and an integer k as follows.
We consider the variables x 1 , . . . , x n and y 1 , . . . , y m and we introduce fresh variables x 
We define the integrity constraint Γ as follows. We let
(Here ⊕ denotes exclusive disjunction.) As a result of the definition of Γ, each complete and consistent judgment set J ∈ J (Φ, Γ) satisfies (at least) one of the following four conditions. 1. For some i ∈ [3] , the judgment set J includes each formula u i,ℓ for ℓ ∈ [u].
2. The judgment set J includes exactly one of x i and x ′ i for each i ∈ [n], it includes none of the formulas z i , it includes exactly one of y j and y ′ j for each j ∈ [m], it includes none of the formulas t j , it includes a, it includes none of the formulas b j , and J does not satisfy ψ. , it includes all formulas t j , for each j ∈ [m] it includes either none or both of y j and y ′ j , it includes a, and it includes none of the formulas b j . We let J = (J 1 , J 2 , J 3 ), where J 1 , J 2 , J 3 are defined as described in Table 5. In this table,  the Moreover, we let J 0 be as described in Table 6 . In this table, the indices i, j, ℓ range over all possible values, and for each ϕ ∈ [Φ] we write a 0 if ϕ ∈ J i and a 1 if ϕ ∈ J i . In addition, we define the weight function w as follows. For each j ∈ [2m+ 4], we let w(b j ) = 1, and for all other formulas ϕ ∈ [Φ], we let w(ϕ) = 0. In other words, the briber wants the formulas b j to be satisfied, and does not care about any other formula. We let k = 1. That is, the briber can bribe exactly one individual.
In the remainder, we will argue that there is some truth assignment α : X → B such that for all truth assignments β : Y → B it holds that ψ[α ∪ β] is true if and only if it is possible to change up to k individual judgment sets in J , resulting in a new profile J ′ , so that for all J Firstly, we observe that Kemeny(J ) = {J * old }, where J * old is defined as described in Table 7 . The judgment set J * old is complete and consistent, and has a cumulative Hamming distance of 6n + 3 + 3u to the profile J. It is straightforward to verify that no complete and consistent judgment set has a smaller cumulative Hamming distance to the profile J .
0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 Table 7 : The judgment set J * old that is used in the proof of Proposition 13.
We observe that the only way for the briber to enforce an outcome that satisfies the formulas b j , is to enforce an outcome J * new that satisfies condition (3). Additionally, we know that any such enforced outcome J * new includes none of the formulas y j and y (⇒) Suppose that there exists some truth assignment α : X → B such that for all truth assignments β : Y → B it holds that ψ[α ∪ β] is true. Consider the complete and consistent judgment set J * α that is described in Table 8 . Moreover, let J ′ be the profile obtained from J by replacing any single judgment set in J by J * α (since the judgment sets in J are symmetric, the argument does not depend on which set is replaced). We then get that Kemeny(J ′ ) = {J * α }. The only possible complete and consistent judgment sets J * that could have a smaller Hamming distance to the profile (J ′ ) would have to satisfy condition (2) . That is, such judgment sets J * would have to include exactly one of y j and y (⇐) Conversely, suppose that it is possible to change a single judgment set in J , resulting in a new profile J ′ , so that for all J * new ∈ Kemeny(J ′ ) and for all J * old ∈ Kemeny(J ) it holds that d(J * new , J 0 , w) < d(J * old , J 0 , w). As we argued above, each such complete and consistent judgment set J * new satisfies condition (3), and furthermore, it does not contain any of the formulas y j , y Table 9 : The judgment set J * β that is used in the proof of Proposition 13.
We now use the fact that J * α ∈ Kemeny(J ′ ) to argue that for all truth assignments β : Y → B it holds that ψ[α ∪ β] is true. We proceed indirectly, and assume that there exists some truth assignment β : Y → B such that ψ[α ∪ β] is false. Then consider the complete and consistent judgment set J * β that is described in Table 9 . Because ψ[α ∪ β] is false, we know that J * β is consistent-it satisfies condition (2). Moreover, d(J *
Namely, the judgment set J * α has Hamming distance 2n + 6m + 8 + 2u to the profile J ′ , and the judgment set J * β has Hamming distance 2n + 6m + 7 + 2u to the profile J ′ . This is a contradiction with the fact that J * α ∈ Kemeny(J ′ ). Therefore, we can conclude that no truth assignment β : Y → B exists such that ψ[α ∪ β] is false. In other words, for all truth assignments β : Y → B it holds that ψ[α ∪ β] is true. (t j ∧ ¬y j ∧ ¬y
(Here ⊕ denotes exclusive disjunction.) We let J = (J 1 , J 2 , J 3 ), where J 1 , J 2 , J 3 are defined as described in Table 10. In this  table, the 
